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I. INTRODUCTION
Racial bias in the United States’ criminal justice system is a serious
problem,1 and Washington State is no exception.2 The groundbreaking
Preliminary Report on Race and Washington’s Criminal Justice System
(Task Force Report) revealed striking evidence of racial and ethnic bias
at various stages of criminal proceedings3 and highlighted the need for an
integrated strategy to combat its prevalence.
Among nine potential causes of racial disparity identified and addressed in the Task Force Report,4 one attracted a great deal of public
attention in 2011: prosecutorial decision-making.5 While the Task Force
Report focused on decision-making in the context of charging and sentencing recommendations,6 decision-making also includes prosecutors’
presentations to the jury and their general courtroom conduct. Specifically, one prosecutor’s blatant use of racial stereotypes in the courtroom in
* J.D. Candidate, Seattle University School of Law, 2012; B.A., Hampshire College, 2006. I thank
the Seattle University Law Review staff for their guidance with this Note, and I am grateful for the
opportunity to contribute to the growing dialogue regarding racial bias in the criminal justice system.
** J.D. Candidate, Seattle University School of Law, 2012; B.A., Psychology, Western Washington
University, 2002. I would like to thank the Seattle University Law Review for providing us an opportunity to discuss what will surely be a seminal case addressing an extremely pervasive problem. I
also thank the Law Review staff for helping to ensure that our discussion of this important subject
was both meaningful and successful.
1. Task Force on Race & the Criminal Justice Sys., Preliminary Report on Race and Washington’s Criminal Justice System, 35 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 623, 627 (2012) [hereinafter Task Force
Report].
2. Id. at 639−40.
3. Id. at 629.
4. Id. The Task Force Report identified and synthesized research on nine issues for which
evidence exists regarding the causes of Washington’s disproportionality: (1) Juvenile Justice; (2)
Prosecutorial Decision-Making; (3) Confinement Sentencing Outcomes; (4) Legal Financial Obligations (LFO); (5) Pretrial Release; (6) Drug Enforcement; (7) Asset Forfeiture; (8) Traffic Stops; and
(9) Driving While License Suspended (DWLS). Id. at 638.
5. Id. at 647.
6. Id.; see also Robert J. Smith & Justin D. Levinson, The Impact of Implicit Racial Bias on the
Exercise of Prosecutorial Discretion, 35 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 795, 814 n.75 (2012).
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State v. Monday7—in which the Washington State Supreme Court held
that the injection of racial bias required reversal—brought prosecutors’
conduct to the center of public debate.8
In April 2006, a man was shot four times following a confrontation
between multiple individuals in downtown Seattle,9 and he succumbed to
his wounds upon arrival at a nearby hospital.10 Two others shot during
the attack survived.11 A video camera close to the scene of the shooting
captured an image of a man in a “distinctive, long red shirt” drawing a
pistol and firing the gunshots that struck all three victims.12 Though
many witnesses gave inconsistent accounts of the incident and were reluctant to cooperate with police, two witnesses identified defendant Kevin L. Monday, Jr. as the shooter.13 Police arrested Monday three weeks
later while he was wearing a red shirt and hat that were “strikingly similar” to the clothing worn by the shooter in the video.14 During subsequent
police questioning, Monday confirmed that he was the man wearing the
red shirt in the video, and he confessed shortly thereafter that he was the
shooter.15 Officers later recovered bullet cartridges from Monday’s home
that were identical to those used in the shooting.16
Prosecutors charged Monday with first-degree murder and two
counts of first-degree assault, and the case proceeded to trial.17 During
the testimony of one witness who previously identified Monday as the
shooter, the prosecutor frequently pronounced the word “police” as “poleese.”18 The prosecutor also referenced a code of conduct that certain
people do not talk to the police about criminal matters.19 He returned to
7. State v. Monday, 257 P.3d 551 (Wash. 2011).
8. See, e.g., Jason A. Gilmer, Guest Opinion: Washington High Court Deals Blow to Racial
Bias, SPOKESMAN-REVIEW, June 19, 2011, http://www.spokesman.com/stories/2011/jun/19/guestopinion-washingtons-high-court-deals-blow/; Jennifer Sullivan, Seattle Murder Conviction Tossed
Out Over “Racist” Comments, SEATTLE TIMES, June 9, 2011, http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/
html/localnews/2015279772_overturned10m.html.
9. Monday, 257 P.3d at 552.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id. The shooter fired a total of eleven gunshots before fleeing outside of the camera’s vantage point. Id. at 561 (Johnson, J., dissenting).
13. Id. at 552 (majority opinion).
14. Id.
15. Id. When police told Monday that his DNA and fingerprints were found on shell casings
from the shooting (which was not true), Monday replied, “I wasn’t trying to kill that man, I didn’t
mean to take his life.” Id. at 553.
16. State v. Monday, No. 60265-9, 2008 WL 5330824, at *10 (Wash. Ct. App. Dec. 22, 2008);
Monday, 257 P.3d at 553. Police also recovered an empty gun holster from Monday’s home. Id.
17. Monday, 257 P.3d at 553.
18. Id. at 553–55.
19. Id. The following is an excerpt from the prosecutor’s questioning of the witness, who was
an African-American woman:
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the theme during closing argument where he made the racial implications
of his theme explicit:
[T]he only thing that can explain to you the reasons why witness after witness after witness is called to this stand and flat out denies
what cannot be denied on that video is the code. And the code is
black folk don’t testify against black folk. You don’t snitch to the
police.20

The prosecutor revisited the theme several times and argued that “the
code” was the reason witnesses gave testimony inconsistent with their
own pretrial statements.21 The jury returned guilty verdicts on all three
counts,22 and the appellate court affirmed the verdicts on appeal.23 On the
question of prosecutorial misconduct, the appellate court held that while
the prosecutor improperly injected racial overtones into the proceedings,
the error was harmless.24
The Washington State Supreme Court disagreed and held that the
prosecutor’s improper conduct constituted reversible error.25 The court
found that “[t]he prosecutor’s misconduct tainted nearly every lay witness’s testimony. It planted the seed in the jury’s mind that most of the
witnesses were, at best, shading the truth to benefit the defendant.”26
Based on this improper conduct, the court determined that it could not
“say beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not contribute to the
Q. And would you agree or disagree with the notion that there is a code on the streets that
you don’t talk to the po-leese?
A. I mean, that’s what some people say. That’s what some people go by.
Q. Well, can you help us understand who these some people are?
A. I’m saying—I’m just saying that’s how some people is. Some people talk to the police, some don’t.
Q. And you’re one of those that don’t, right?
A. I’m saying—well, I don’t—police ain’t my friends or nothing.
....
Q. Does that mean that you’re one of those people who don’t talk to the police?
A. No, sometimes I don’t talk to the po-leese. I mean, they got a question or something to
ask me, I answer. I don’t talk to them.
Id. at 553. The prosecutor concluded this line of questioning when, in response to the witness noting
that numerous witnesses to the shooting did not contact the police, he asked again whether there is “a
code on the streets that you don’t call the poleese.” Id. at 554.
20. Id. at 555.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. State v. Monday, No. 60265-9, 2008 WL 5330824, at *12 (Wash. Ct. App. Dec. 22, 2008).
24. The court found that “[t]he prosecutor’s actions in Monday’s trial were clearly improper
when he invoked race in his closing argument and affected an accent when questioning Sykes.” Id. at
*10. But it held that the prosecutor’s improper conduct constituted harmless error because of the
large amount of evidence admitted against Monday. Id.
25. Monday, 257 P.3d at 558.
26. Id.
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verdicts,” and thus held that a new trial was required.27 In so holding, the
court radically reshaped the long-used analysis for prosecutorial misconduct and signaled a new intolerance toward racial bias in criminal proceedings.
But the court did not unanimously fashion a single test for use in
cases of alleged prosecutorial misconduct involving racial bias, which
prompted an ensuing debate within Washington’s legal community.28
The tests articulated in Monday’s majority, concurring, and dissenting
opinions provide three different ways to address the complex problem of
racial bias in Washington that continues to persist. All three tests
acknowledge that racial bias during criminal trials is a serious problem
that requires a strong judicial response. But the appropriate form of that
response prompted separate opinions that highlight four distinct differences regarding how to best combat racial bias.
First, the opinions differ regarding the source of law that should be
applied when an existing legal framework proves inadequate to address a
social problem. Following Monday, an open question remains regarding
whether it is best to draw upon existing legal precedent, even if attenuated, or whether it is better to combat old problems with new law. Second,
the three opinions differ in the degree of racial bias required to trigger a
reversal of a conviction. Thus, the opinions raise a question as to whether
a showing of flagrant or apparent racial bias should be necessary for a
court to vacate a conviction, or whether racial bias in the courtroom is so
offensive that any showing of racial discrimination should be sufficient
to vacate a conviction.
Third, the opinions differ in the amount of judicial discretion they
afford courts to identify racial bias, which is of particular importance
because many appeals to racial bias are subtle or unconscious.29 But
questions persist regarding the criteria that should be used to decide
whether racial bias is present in the courtroom. Finally, the three opinions do not conclusively define how much weight courts should afford
competing interests in determining an appropriate judicial response to
racial bias. Whether victims’ rights and the legitimacy of the criminal
justice system as a whole should be considered remains unresolved.
Despite their differences, both the majority and concurring opinions
in Monday present new ways to address prosecutorial misconduct, deter
the injection of racial bias into courtroom proceedings, and create substantively similar outcomes. Part II of this Note discusses the traditional
prosecutorial misconduct test in Washington State, as well as the rules
27. Id.
28. See, e.g., Gilmer, supra note 8; Sullivan, supra note 8.
29. Task Force Report, supra note 1, at 629.
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articulated by the Monday majority and concurrence. Part III discusses
the implications of both the majority and concurring opinions, the primary differences in their approaches to deterrence, the degree of racial bias
they require to warrant reversal of a conviction, and the discretion they
afford the judiciary. Part III also suggests that courts must consider both
the rights of criminal defendants and the aggregate impacts of racial bias
on society at large when fashioning a rule to combat racial bias.
II. WHEN THE EXISTING LEGAL FRAMEWORK FALLS SHORT:
TRADITIONAL ANALYSIS FOR PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT
The majority and concurring opinions in Monday were both
groundbreaking due to their departure from Washington legal precedent.
For nearly forty years, Washington courts have employed a prosecutorial
misconduct test that requires reversal if the prosecuting attorney’s conduct is both improper and prejudicial.30 Under this test, courts consider
the effect of the prosecutor’s improper conduct in the context of the full
trial, rather than in isolation.31 Generally, the appellant must demonstrate
a substantial likelihood that the misconduct affected the jury’s verdict in
order to warrant reversal.32 If the defendant fails to object to a prosecutor’s conduct during the trial, then the burden on the defendant is even
higher. The prosecutor’s conduct must then be so flagrant and illintentioned that it causes an enduring and resulting prejudice that could
not have been neutralized by a curative instruction to the jury.33 Despite
the longstanding history of the law, both the majority and concurrence in
Monday found the traditional test for prosecutorial misconduct insufficient to address instances where a prosecutor injects racial bias into a
criminal trial.
In contrast to the traditional prosecutorial misconduct analysis,
courts apply a heightened harmless error standard in Washington when
an error during trial implicates a constitutional right.34 If the appellant
shows that a constitutional error occurred, “the State bears the burden of
proving that the error was harmless” because the error is presumptively
prejudicial.35 “A constitutional error is harmless if the appellate court is
30. See, e.g., Monday, 257 P.3d at 555; State v. Fisher, 202 P.3d 937, 947 (Wash. 2009) (citing
State v. Gregory, 147 P.3d 1201, 1253 (Wash. 2006)).
31. See, e.g., State v. McKenzie, 134 P.3d 221, 226 (Wash. 2006).
32. State v. Yates, 168 P.3d 359, 392 (Wash. 2007) (citing State v. Brown, 940 P.2d 529, 564
(Wash. 1997)).
33. Fisher, 202 P.3d at 951.
34. State v. Guloy, 705 P.2d 1182, 1191 (Wash. 1985). This heightened standard is referred to
as the constitutional harmless error standard. See, e.g., State v. Moreno, 132 P.3d 1137, 1142 (Wash.
Ct. App. 2006).
35. Guloy, 705 P.2d at 1191.
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convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that any reasonable jury would
have reached the same result in the absence of the error.”36 Thus, the
primary features of this constitutional harmless error standard are that it
(1) shifts the burden of proof to the State and (2) requires a showing of
harmless error beyond a reasonable doubt.
Courts traditionally apply constitutional harmless error to certain
types of prosecutorial misconduct. When a prosecutor has been shown to
have improperly implicated a constitutional right of a defendant, courts
apply a constitutional harmless error analysis that requires reversal unless the State demonstrates “beyond a reasonable doubt that the evidence
is so overwhelming that it necessarily leads to a finding of guilt.”37 Subsequent appellate court decisions have frequently relied on this formulation,38 which is the functional equivalent of the constitutional harmless
error standard. Courts apply this standard when constitutional rights other than the right to a fair trial are impacted by the prosecutor’s actions.39
For example, one court applied the constitutional harmless error standard
when a prosecutor improperly referenced the defendant’s choice to exercise his right to self-representation.40
Courts also apply burden-shifting when analyzing accusations of
prosecutorial misconduct that arise from racial bias during jury selection.41 If a defendant establishes a prima facie case for purposeful discrimination regarding how a prosecutor exercised a peremptory challenge,42 then “the burden shifts to the one making the challenge to articulate a race-neutral explanation for each challenge.”43 The trial court then
considers all relevant circumstances in order to determine whether a
challenge was improperly motivated.44 It is during the trial court’s de36. Id.
37. State v. Traweek, 715 P.2d 1148, 1153 (Wash. Ct. App. 1986), overruled on other grounds,
State v. Blair, 816 P.2d 718 (Wash. 1991).
38. See, e.g., Moreno, 132 P.3d at 1142; State v. Contreras, 788 P.2d 1114, 1115 (Wash. Ct.
App. 1990), rev. denied, 797 P.2d 514 (Wash. 1990).
39. Traweek, 715 P.2d at 1152–53.
40. Moreno, 132 P.3d at 1142. During closing arguments, the prosecutor stated, “The defendant is a picture perfect example of a domestic violence abuser. He has got to be in control. He is still
trying to call the shots. So much so that he has exercised his constitutional rights to defend himself,
because power is that important to him.” Id. (emphasis omitted).
41. See generally Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
42. “A defendant meets this burden if he or she establishes [that] peremptory challenges were
exercised against a member of a protected class; and if so, when taken together with other relevant
circumstances, an inference can be raised indicating the challenge was based on membership in the
class.” State v. Beliz, 15 P.3d 683, 687 (Wash. Ct. App. 2001). This step simply requires a defendant
to produce sufficient evidence “to permit the trial judge to draw an inference that discrimination has
occurred.” Johnson v. California, 545 U.S. 162, 170 (2005).
43. Beliz, 15 P.3d at 687.
44. Johnson, 545 U.S. at 170. Specifically, the trial court may base its determination on both
the prosecution’s explanation and the juror’s demeanor and credibility. Beliz, 15 P.3d at 687.
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termination that the persuasiveness of the prosecution’s justification becomes relevant.45
But the traditional prosecutorial misconduct analysis, absent any
burden shift, is the test historically applied when a prosecutor injects racial bias into trial proceedings. The Monday dissent is demonstrative of
this approach, as it applied traditional law to arrive at a result contrary to
the outcome reached by the other two opinions.46 In fact, the dissent expressly criticized the other opinions for their departure from Washington
case law.47 According to the dissent, the circumstances in Monday were
not indications of systematic failure, and were thus insufficient to warrant departure from forty years of precedent.
The dissent applied the traditional prosecutorial misconduct test and
found that the prosecutor’s conduct did not warrant reversal. First, the
dissent found that the prosecutor’s use of the pronunciation “po-leese”
was improper.48 But it did not find any impropriety in the prosecutor’s
references to “the code,” as it characterized such arguments as broad
statements describing “a too common occurrence: the unwillingness of
individuals (no matter their age or race) to identify by name others who
may be involved in crime.”49 The dissent then found that the defendant’s
convictions did not warrant reversal after balancing the prosecutor’s improper actions, the wealth of evidence admitted against the defendant,
and the instructions given to the jury.50 Under the traditional analysis, the
persuasive value of the video evidence admitted against the defendant
weighed heavily in favor of harmless error.51 The dissent believed that
“[e]ven if the prosecutor’s comments arguably tainted the jury’s impressions of some witnesses, this could not affect the jury’s perception of the
videotape and other evidence.”52 Thus, it found that the defendant did not
demonstrate a substantial likelihood that the misconduct affected the jury’s verdict.53
45. Johnson, 545 U.S. at 171.
46. See State v. Monday, 257 P.3d 551, 564–65 (Wash. 2011) (Johnson, J., dissenting).
47. Id. at 565 (“[The court] never meddle[s] with such established constitutional protections,
unless a compelling showing is made that the current test has failed and is causing harm.”).
48. Id. at 564 (characterizing the prosecutor’s use of the pronunciation “po-leese” as “inappropriate and unprofessional”). But the dissent felt that the court could not find, based solely on the trial
transcript, that the pronunciation was de facto “racially derogatory language.” Id.
49. Id. at 563. But to find that statements regarding “the code” were not improper, the dissent
minimized the overt racial link included in the references. See id. (treating the statement “black folk
don’t testify against black folk” as a racially neutral condemnation of witnesses’ unwillingness to
testify).
50. Id. at 564.
51. Id. at 562–63 (viewing the videotape evidence as sufficient to prove that the defendant
committed deliberate, premeditated murder).
52. Id. at 565.
53. Id.
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Neither the majority nor the concurring opinion in Monday disputed
whether the prosecutor’s conduct constituted harmless error under the
traditional analysis of prosecutorial misconduct. Indeed, the dissent stated that “[t]he majority’s refusal to thoroughly engage in the second
prong of [the traditional] analysis is tacit acknowledgment that the defendant” would not have been found to be prejudiced under the traditional standard.54 But both the majority and concurring opinions acknowledged that the traditional analysis of prosecutorial misconduct was insufficient to address instances where the prosecutor intentionally injects racial bias into the proceedings. And in hopes of deterring future appeals to
racial bias, both broke from tradition and applied novel legal analyses
that would vacate convictions obtained under facts analogous to those in
Monday.
III. NEW APPROACHES TO AN OLD PROBLEM: COMBATING RACIAL BIAS
IN STATE V. MONDAY
Both the majority and the concurrence departed from traditional legal precedent in State v. Monday, implicitly suggesting that the existing
law on prosecutorial misconduct was insufficient to address prosecutors’
use of racial bias in the courtroom. Section A outlines the tests proffered
by both the majority and the concurrence in Monday, while section B
highlights the similarities and differences in the practical application of
the two tests.
A. Departure from Tradition: The Rules Articulated by the Monday
Majority and Concurrence
Both opinions acknowledge that racial bias is a problem, and although their approaches to combating its prevalence appear to markedly
differ, they are, in practice, substantively similar.
1. The Majority Rule: Flagrant or Apparent Appeals to Racial Bias
May Warrant a New Trial
In Monday, the Washington State Supreme Court departed from
convention55 and applied the constitutional harmless error standard to
prosecutorial misconduct inquiries arising from racial bias.56 A fivejustice majority held “that when a prosecutor flagrantly or apparently
intentionally appeals to racial bias in a way that undermines the defend54. Id.
55. Id. at 558 (majority opinion) (“If our past efforts to address prosecutorial misconduct have
proved insufficient to deter [intentional appeals to racial bias], then we must apply other tested and
proven tests.”).
56. Id.
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ant’s credibility or the presumption of innocence, [the court] will vacate
the conviction unless it appears beyond a reasonable doubt that the misconduct did not affect the jury’s verdict.”57 The majority also expressly
stated that when the defendant demonstrates that such misconduct occurred, the burden is on the State to demonstrate beyond a reasonable
doubt that the misconduct was harmless.58 The court then applied this
new standard to the facts of Monday and held that, due to the pervasiveness of the “taint” caused by the prosecutor’s misconduct, it “[could not]
say beyond a reasonable doubt that the [misconduct] did not contribute to
the verdicts.”59
While the majority opinion departed from the existing law on prosecutorial misconduct, its application of a constitutional harmless error
standard has some basis in Washington law. As previously described,60
courts apply the constitutional harmless error standard when a prosecutor
improperly implicates a defendant’s constitutional right.61 Although not
historically applied to conduct that impacts a defendant’s right to a fair
trial,62 the majority’s application of constitutional harmless error to prosecutorial misconduct involving racial bias can be viewed as a modest
extension of prior law to a narrow subset of instances in which the right
to a fair trial is affected. Additionally, courts use burden-shifting to analyze claims of racial bias in the selection of a jury.63 While the standard
applied differs from constitutional harmless error, the use of burdenshifting indicates that courts recognize that once racial bias is demonstrated, the party who engaged in the improper conduct should bear the
burden of justification. Nonetheless, the majority’s rule still represents a
novel application of these principles.
2. The Concurrence: Zero Tolerance for Racial Bias
The Monday concurrence fashioned a new rule never before applied
in Washington State. It proposed that any degree of racial discrimination
is sufficient to vacate a conviction, regardless of whether the bias had an
impact on the outcome of the trial.64 The concurring opinion stated that
“[a] criminal conviction must not be allowed to stand when it is obtained
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. See supra Part II.
61. See, e.g., State v. Moreno, 132 P.3d 1137, 1142 (Wash. Ct. App. 2006); State v. Contreras,
788 P.2d 1114, 1115 (Wash. Ct. App. 1990).
62. See State v. Traweek, 715 P.2d 1148, 1152–53 (Wash. Ct. App. 1986), overruled on other
grounds, State v. Blair, 816 P.2d 718 (Wash. 1991).
63. See, e.g., State v. Beliz, 15 P.3d 683, 687 (Wash. Ct. App. 2001).
64. Monday, 257 P.3d at 559 (Madsen, C.J., concurring).
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in a trial permeated by racial bias deliberately introduced by the prosecution.”65 Thus, “regardless of the evidence of . . . guilt, the injection of
insidious discrimination into [a] case is so repugnant to the core principles of integrity and justice upon which a fundamentally fair criminal
justice system must rest that only a new trial will remove its taint.”66 The
concurrence’s proposed rule takes a hard stance on any racial discrimination employed by prosecutors in the courtroom, and is the most extreme
of the three Monday opinions.
The concurrence based its proffered rule on the “core principles of
integrity and justice upon which a fundamentally fair criminal justice
system must rest.”67 As indicated by the concurrence’s reliance on case
law from outside jurisdictions, those core principles of integrity and justice are grounded in the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses.68
While no other Washington case has expressly held that a prosecutor’s
injection of racial bias impeded the right to a fair trial, the Washington
State Supreme Court previously made clear that the presence of racial
bias in jury members amounts to a violation of due process.69 But outside
Washington, ample authority exists for the premise that a prosecutor’s
injection of racial considerations into a case undermines a defendant’s
fundamental right to a fair trial.70 Thus, while the concurrence in Monday
proposed the creation of a new rule and the expansion of due process in
Washington, that proposal rested on the foundations of due process already recognized in other jurisdictions.
B. Tackling Subtle Discrimination: The Deterrence of Racial Bias and
the Role of Judicial Discretion
Deterring prosecutors’ use of racial bias in the courtroom was of
central importance in both the majority and concurring opinions. But the
two opinions differ in their view of how courts should deter racist conduct. The majority deters prosecutors’ injection of racial bias into trial
proceedings by imposing a high burden on the State to show that the appeal to race did not impact the outcome of the case. In contrast, the con65. Id. at 558.
66. Id. at 558–59.
67. Id. at 558.
68. Id. at 559 (“[S]uch cases involve the ‘point where the due process and equal protection
clauses overlap or at least meet.’” (quoting United States ex rel. Haynes v. McKendrick, 481 F.2d
152, 159 (2d Cir. 1973))).
69. State v. Davis, 10 P.3d 977, 994 (Wash. 2000) (“Under the laws of Washington, the right to
a jury trial includes the right to an unbiased and unprejudiced jury. ‘The failure to accord an accused
a fair hearing violates the minimal standards of due process.’” (citing State v. Parnell, 463 P.2d 134,
137 (Wash. 1969))).
70. See, e.g., Hamilton v. Alabama, 376 U.S. 650 (1964).
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curring opinion imposes a per se ban on any resort to racial discrimination. Additionally, the opinions differ on the degree of racial bias necessary to warrant reversal, as well as the discretion that should be afforded
courts to determine whether reversal is warranted.
1. Practical Effect of the Rules Articulated by the Monday
Majority and Concurrence
The majority imposed its new standard as a deterrent measure
against the use of racist arguments and other appeals to racial bias, which
it viewed as “fundamentally opposed to our founding principles, values,
and fabric of our justice system.”71 As the opinion explained, “When the
government resorts to appeals to racial bias to achieve its ends, all of society suffers . . . .”72 The majority noted that a prosecutor’s intentional
appeals to racial bias violate a defendant’s right to a fair and impartial
trial:73
Because appeals by a prosecutor to racial bias necessarily seek to
single out one racial minority for different treatment, it fundamentally undermines the principle of equal justice and is so repugnant to
the concept of an impartial trial its very existence demands that appellate courts set appropriate standards to deter such conduct.74

As the majority eloquently stated, “If justice is not equal for all, it is not
justice.”75 Having recognized that the “highly improper” conduct of the
prosecutor in Monday would essentially be rewarded under a traditional
harmless error analysis, the majority deemed that analysis to be “insufficient to deter such conduct” and thus expanded the use of the constitutional harmless error standard.76 The majority thus achieved its goal of
deterring racial bias by placing a high burden on the State to show that an
appeal to race did not impact the outcome of the case.
But the majority’s approach has been criticized for minimizing the
evidence admitted against the defendant in order to find that the State did
not meet its burden under the constitutional harmless error standard.77
71. Monday, 257 P.3d at 557.
72. Id. at 558 n.5.
73. Id. at 557–58. The court clarified that “[t]he constitutional promise of an ‘impartial jury
trial’ commands jury indifference to race.” Id. at 557. “‘[T]heories and arguments based upon racial,
ethnic and most other stereotypes are antithetical to and impermissible in a fair and impartial trial.’”
Id. at 557 (quoting State v. Dhaliwal, 79 P.3d 432, 444 (Wash. 2003) (Chambers, J., concurring)).
74. Id. at 558.
75. Id. at 557.
76. Id. at 557–58.
77. See Michael Callahan, Note, “If Justice Is Not Equal For All, It Is Not Justice”: Racial
Bias, Prosecutorial Misconduct, and the Right to a Fair Trial in State v. Monday, 35 SEATTLE U. L.
REV. 827, 836 (2012) (arguing that the majority minimized the strength of the State’s case in order
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For instance, the concurring opinion expressly recognized that the defendant confessed to the murder,78 and both the concurrence and dissent
discussed the persuasiveness of the video evidence, with the dissent addressing the matter at length.79 The majority opinion did not mention the
defendant’s confession outside of its recitation of the facts,80 and it relegated all discussion of the video evidence to a footnote in which it admitted that “the videotape clearly establishes that Monday was the shooter.”81 While the majority argued that the video did not establish premeditation or rule out some defenses,82 it also did not recognize the additional
evidence admitted against the defendant, such as the casings found at his
home, the out-of-court identifications of him as the shooter, and above
all, the confession he made to police.83
Regardless of whether the majority downplayed the evidence in order to reach a specific result, the precedential value of its treatment of the
evidence, when combined with the constitutional harmless error standard, creates an extremely difficult burden for the State to satisfy. In order
for the State to carry its burden, it must demonstrate “beyond a reasonable doubt, that the misconduct did not affect the [jury’s] verdict.”84 In
Monday, the evidence admitted against the defendant was very strong:
(1) the defendant was caught on video scuffling with and shooting the
victims; (2) two witnesses provided out-of-court statements identifying
the defendant as the shooter; (3) the defendant was arrested wearing a
shirt and hat that were “strikingly similar” to those he wore the night of
the shooting; (4) bullet cartridges matching those used in the shooting
were found in the defendant’s home; and (5) the defendant confessed to
both the shooting and the murder.85 Under the harmless error analysis,
the evidence must be weighed against the prosecutorial misconduct,
which included numerous references to a purported African-American
antisnitching code and four uses of the pronunciation “po-leese.”86
Despite the substantial evidence entered against the defendant, the
majority still did not find that the State met its burden to demonstrate
to hold that the error warranted a new trial); see also Monday, 257 P.3d at 559 (Madsen, C.J., concurring) (characterizing the majority’s harmless error analysis as “illusory”).
78. Monday, 257 P.3d at 559 n.1 (Madsen, C.J., concurring). The same footnote also references
the dissent’s recognition of the confession, id., though it appears that any once-made references by
the dissent to that particular statement were removed prior to publication of the opinion.
79. See id.; id. at 560–63 (Johnson, J., dissenting).
80. Id. at 553 (majority opinion).
81. Id. at 558 n.4.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 553.
84. Id. at 558.
85. Id. at 553.
86. Id. at 553–55.
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harmless error. Again, the defendant was clearly caught on video shooting the victims, and he later confessed, in no uncertain terms, that he was
the shooter. Both of these pieces of evidence were admitted at trial, and
the state supreme court still did not find harmless error. The practical
effect of the majority’s holding is that when future courts look to apply
constitutional harmless error to facts that are analogous to those in Monday, they will note that even near-overwhelming evidence against the
defendant is insufficient to overcome an intentional injection of racial
bias into the proceedings.
The concurring opinion took a different approach to deterring racial
bias in the courtroom by proposing a per se ban on any resort to racial
discrimination. The opinion stated that “[r]egardless of the evidence
against this defendant, a criminal conviction must not be permitted to
stand on such a foundation. The appeals to racism here by an officer of
the court are so repugnant to the fairness, integrity, and justness of the
criminal justice system that reversal is required.”87 Thus, the concurrence
suggested that Monday’s conviction should be reversed because “the integrity of our justice system demands it.”88
Legal scholars have questioned whether the Monday majority opinion created such a high burden for the State that it effectively serves as
an illusory harmless error standard.89 Indeed, it is difficult to imagine a
circumstance in which the state could meet its burden, considering the
overwhelming evidence of guilt accumulated against the defendant in
Monday. “Rather than engage in an unconvincing attempt to show the
error here was not harmless,”90 the concurrence would have held that any
resort to racial bias is enough to warrant reversal, even if it had no impact on the outcome of the case. The proffered rule would have a strong
deterring effect, and prosecutors would likely think twice before resorting to any conduct that could be perceived as racially biased.
Ultimately, regardless of whether courts apply the constitutional
harmless error standard’s heavy burden of proof or the concurrence’s per
se reversal of convictions tainted with racial discrimination, a strong deterrence against prosecutorial appeals to racial bias will be realized.
2. The Degree of Racial Bias Necessary to Warrant Reversal
While both the majority and concurring opinions agree that racial
bias in the courtroom is a serious concern and should not be tolerated, the
87. Id. at 560 (Madsen, C.J., concurring).
88. Id.
89. Callahan, supra note 77, at 839; see also Monday, 257 P.3d at 559 (Madsen, C.J., concurring) (characterizing the majority’s harmless error analysis as “illusory”).
90. Monday, 257 P.3d at 559 (Madsen, C.J., concurring).
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question that remains following Monday is whether a verdict tainted by
racial bias should ever be permitted to stand. In some instances—albeit
rare—the majority opinion would allow for a verdict to stand even if the
prosecutor exhibited racial bias during the course of the trial. So long as
the State produced sufficient evidence to demonstrate beyond a reasonable doubt that the appeal did not affect either the credibility of the defendant or the presumption of innocence, the court could deem the racial
bias harmless. But under the concurrence’s proffered rule, a verdict could
never stand if racial discrimination was deliberately introduced during
the trial proceedings, even if the evidence accumulated against the defendant was substantial and the appeal to race had no impact.91 While the
level of tolerance for racial bias raises questions regarding from whose
perspective one should measure resulting harm, an application of either
test will likely produce substantially similar outcomes.
Some scholars express concern that, similar to the traditional harmless error standard employed in the dissent, the majority’s rule still allows for instances of racial bias.92 Under the majority rule, if racial bias
is introduced into the trial proceedings but the State satisfies its burden
under constitutional harmless error, then no new trial is warranted. This
allowance of racial bias is in stark contrast with the concurrence’s proposed rule, which would essentially create a per se ban against the injection of racial bias.93
But this criticism ignores the fact that the majority in Monday
granted a new trial even when faced with very substantial evidence supporting the defendant’s guilt. As the concurrence stated in Monday, “a
prosecutor’s intentional appeals to racial prejudices cannot be minimized
or easily rationalized as harmless,”94 and the manner in which the majority applied its rule demonstrates just how difficult it will be for the State
to show harmlessness under that rule. Courts currently have only the
facts of Monday to analogize or distinguish when ruling on prosecutorial
misconduct that involves racial bias. And an appellate court seeking to
uphold such misconduct as harmless will have to provide a strong justification for its decision, lest it later be reversed by the state supreme court.
The concurrence’s proffered rule minimizes the impact that racial
bias must have on the outcome of the case to warrant reversal. According
to the concurrence, racial discrimination need not have a definitive impact on any one aspect of the case to reverse a conviction, for the “injection of such discrimination is ‘antithetical to the purposes of the four91. Id.
92. See Callahan, supra note 77, at 841−42.
93. Id. at 843.
94. Monday, 257 P.3d at 558 (Madsen, C.J., concurring).
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teenth amendment . . . whether in a procedure underlying, the atmosphere surrounding, or the actual conduct, of a trial.’”95 Thus, the concurring opinion seems to suggest that any improper appeal to race, not just
blatant racial discrimination, is enough to affect a defendant’s right to a
fair trial.96
Under the concurrence’s proposed rule, “the right to a fair trial that
is free of improper racial implications is so basic to the federal Constitution that an infringement upon that right can never be treated as harmless error.”97 Because the concurrence’s proposed rule would treat any
improper resort to race as harmful to the core principles of the criminal
justice system, it evaluates the resulting error not solely from the perspective of the criminal defendant, but also from the perspective of society at large. The rule recognizes that while racial prejudice may not influence the outcome of a case if there is sufficient evidence to convict the
defendant, the use of racial bias has an impact beyond the courtroom—it
undermines faith in the judiciary, facilitates the continued use of racial
stereotypes, and perpetuates racial disparities in the criminal justice system.98
3. Judicial Discretion in Reversing a Conviction: Do Victims’
Rights and Efficiency Matter?
The primary difference between the analyses of prosecutorial misconduct articulated by the majority and concurring opinions is the
amount of discretion afforded appellate courts in determining whether a
verdict should be reversed. Considering the high burden established in
Monday, the application of either test will likely result in the same outcome. Thus, the future state of the law will largely depend on how favorably courts regard the continued existence of some, albeit limited, discretion to find harmless error when a prosecutor injects racial bias into trial
proceedings.
The discretion allowed by the Monday majority opinion provides
courts with the ability to address the dissent’s concerns of justice and
efficiency.99 Under the majority, courts may find harmless error in instances where the prosecutor’s injection of racial bias did not affect the
95. Id. (citing United States ex rel. Haynes v. McKendrick, 481 F.2d 152, 159 (2d Cir. 1973)).
96. Id. (citing Weddington v. State, 545 A.2d 607, 610 (Del. 1988)).
97. Id. (emphasis added).
98. Task Force Report, supra note 1, at 663.
99. The dissent felt that the rule articulated by the majority “delays or denies justice for the
victim, disregarding the constitutional rights of Francisco Green and his family as victims under
article I, section 35 of the Washington State Constitution. It is possible to deter any problematic trial
conduct without denying justice for Francisco Green and his family.” Monday, 257 P.3d at 561
(Johnson, J., dissenting).
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proceedings. The court may thereby ensure speedy justice for the victims
and efficient use of the court’s limited resources when the ordering of a
new trial would be needless. Given the weight of the evidence against the
defendant, if the prosecutor in Monday never made any reference to “the
code” but used the pronunciation “po-leese” four times, would a new
trial have been warranted? What if he had said “po-leese” only once? At
some point, the need for deterrence may be outweighed by other concerns of the court, and the majority’s opinion provides courts with the
tools to address that possibility.
The concurrence allows appellate courts no discretion in deciding
whether racial bias warrants a reversal. If racial discrimination is present,
reversal is required per se. The opinion makes no mention of efficiency,100 seemingly prioritizing the right to a fair trial over any concerns of
judicial economy. There is a preexisting basis in Washington law for
minimizing efficiency in favor of protecting defendants’ rights to be free
from racial bias. The Washington State Supreme Court previously stated
that “more important than speedy justice is the recognition that every
defendant is entitled to a fair trial before 12 unprejudiced and unbiased
jurors. Not only should there be a fair trial, but there should be no lingering doubt about it.”101
But defendants in criminal proceedings are entitled to only a fair
trial, not an error-free trial.102 Thus, one’s view of the rules articulated by
the majority and concurrence will depend largely on whether one believes it possible, under any circumstances, for a trial to be fair if racial
bias is injected into the proceedings.
4. Defining Racial Bias in Contemporary Proceedings
One of the challenges of combating racial bias is that racial stereotypes are often rooted in learned human behavior and reflected in decision-making that is difficult to isolate.103 While racial bias can be difficult to identify, the aggregate impact of those decisions is easier to locate
and measure.104 And it is largely the aggregate impact, rather than indi100. While the concurring opinion does not expressly address concerns of judicial economy,
the impact of the rule’s application may indirectly address them. If all convictions resulting from a
trial tainted by racial discrimination were reversed, the resulting deterrent effect would eradicate
prosecutors’ incentive to resort to racial bias—and do so quickly. With fewer prosecutors resorting
to conduct that could be deemed racially biased, fewer convictions, if any, may require reversal.
101. State v. Davis, 10 P.3d 977, 994 (Wash. 2000) (citing State v. Parnell, 463 P.2d 134, 137
(Wash. 1969)).
102. State v. Fisher, 202 P.3d 937, 947 (Wash. 2009).
103. Task Force Report, supra note 1, at 629; see also Smith & Levinson, supra note 6, 823
n.116.
104. Id. at 663.
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vidual behaviors, that produces a lasting impact on society. Thus, in order to reduce racial bias among prosecutors, courts must address not only
blatant and conscious bias, but also subtle and unconscious bias.105 Both
the majority and concurring opinion do just that—the majority through
its acknowledgement of “apparent racial bias” and the concurrence
through its zero-tolerance approach to racial discrimination.
Acknowledging the need to address subtle and unconscious bias is a
much-needed step in combating racial disparities within Washington’s
criminal justice system. The Task Force Report findings indicate that
racial disproportionalities in Washington’s criminal justice system are
not primarily caused by intentional racism, but rather by practices and
policies that facilitate racialized outcomes.106 Because most racial bias is
unconscious, the Task Force Report recommended concentration not on
individual motives but instead on those practices and procedures that
cumulatively produce racial disproportionalities.107
The Monday majority opinion acknowledged that bias may be difficult to identify, as “[n]ot all appeals to racial prejudice are blatant. Perhaps more effective but just as insidious are subtle references. Like
wolves in sheep’s clothing, a careful word here and there can trigger racial bias.”108 But just how to identify the subtle racial bias or how to
tackle its use remains open to debate. Specifically, whether the impact of
subtle bias should be measured from the standpoint of only the criminal
defendant or from the standpoint of society at large remains an open
question.
The concurrence’s rule takes a strong stance on subtle racial bias
because it considers not just the impact of racial discrimination on a particular case but also the aggregate impact of that discrimination.109 As
described in the Task Force Report, while subtle biases have some influence in any given case, they have their most substantial effects over
time.110 Thus, by measuring the impact of racial bias by its aggregate
impact on society at large, rather than as it pertains to a single criminal
defendant, the concurrence seeks to eradicate racial bias within the system as a whole.

105. Id. at 644.
106. “[R]ace-effects are likely to be unconscious and unintended rather than conscious and
purposeful. While traditional models of racism emphasize individual acts of discrimination or racially charged policies, structural racism describes the interaction between various institutions and practices that are neutral on their face but nevertheless produce racialized outcomes.” Id. at 645.
107. Id.
108. State v. Monday, 257 P.3d 551, 557 (Wash. 2011).
109. See id. at 559 (Madsen, C.J., concurring).
110. Task Force Report, supra note 1, at 663.
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But what standard are courts to apply when determining whether
racial bias exists in a particular case, however subtle or unconscious it
may be? The majority’s opinion provides meaningful guidance to future
courts as to what type of conduct constitutes an injection of racial bias.
Monday held that constitutional harmless error is applied “when a prosecutor flagrantly or apparently intentionally appeals to racial bias in a way
that undermines the defendant’s credibility or the presumption of innocence.”111 The inclusion of qualifying terms such as flagrant,112 apparent,113 and intentional114 provides courts with guidelines for the application of the new standard and demonstrates that the improper act must be
clear to the court.115
The facts of Monday also help to demonstrate the situations to
which this standard applies. The prosecution’s repeated invocation of an
African-American antisnitch code “functioned as an attempt to discount
several witnesses’ testimony on the basis of race alone.”116 The court
recognized that more subtle references can be just as insidious.117 The
prosecutor’s use of the pronunciation “po-leese” was regarded by the
court as a likely deliberate attempt to call attention to the ethnicity of the
witness and to emphasize the aforementioned code.118 Again, “[l]ike
wolves in sheep’s clothing, a careful word here and there can trigger racial bias.”119 Both types of improper prosecutorial conduct had the effect
of undermining the presumption of the defendant’s innocence by
“plant[ing] the seed in the jury’s mind that most of the witnesses were, at
best, shading the truth to benefit the defendant.”120
In contrast to the majority’s formulation of the types of racial bias
to which its rule is applied, the concurrence provides courts with great
discretion in determining whether racial discrimination is present in a
particular case. Despite affording zero discretion for a court to let a verdict tainted by racial bias stand, the opinion provided no criteria upon
which to gauge whether a prosecutor engaged in racial discrimination.
One possible result is that courts would apply a “you know it when you
see it” analysis, considering the facts and circumstances of each case.
111. Monday, 257 P.3d at 558.
112. When used to describe an offense or an offender, “flagrant” means “glaring, notorious,
scandalous, [or] blatant.” SHORTER OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 978 (6th ed. 2007).
113. Something is “apparent” when it is visible, manifest, or obvious. BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY 112 (9th ed. 2009).
114. An act is “intentional” when “[d]one with the aim of carrying out the act.” Id. at 883.
115. See supra Part II.A.1.
116. Monday, 257 P.3d at 557.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 558.
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But if the concurrence’s rule is applied at some future date, then courts
may simply utilize the formulation given by the majority as guidance for
its application.
Regardless of whether courts apply the rule from the majority or the
concurrence, the true fight over prosecutorial misconduct will lie in
whether the defendant has demonstrated that improper conduct occurred
that would warrant application of the second step of the rule. Whether
the second step is shifting the burden to the State or vacating the verdict,
both the majority and the concurrence require courts to first determine
whether a particular type of improper conduct occurred. Under the concurrence’s standard, a demonstration that improper conduct occurred requires the court, without any further analysis, to vacate the verdict and
remand the case for a new trial.121 Under the majority’s rule, a showing
of improper conduct then shifts the burden to the State to demonstrate
beyond a reasonable doubt that the conduct was harmless.122 This standard, as applied to the facts present in Monday, is likely to be very difficult for the State to satisfy.123 Thus, the State will likely focus its efforts
on contending that no misconduct occurred that would trigger the second
step of whichever rule applies.124
IV. CONCLUSION
The Task Force Report concludes with the following reminder:
Our democracy is based on the rule of law and faith in the fairness
of the justice system. This faith is undermined by disparity and by
high-profile incidents of violence toward people of color by law enforcement. The problem is not a “people of color” problem. It is our
problem as a society to address.125

As acknowledged in the Task Force Report, the legitimacy of
Washington’s criminal justice system is limited by the extent to which
the people appreciate its value. Thus, if the people of Washington lose
faith in the criminal justice system because convictions tainted by racial
bias are permitted to stand, not just criminal defendants but all of society
will suffer. While the future of the law combating prosecutorial racial
121. Id. at 559 (Madsen, C.J., concurring).
122. Id. at 558 (majority opinion).
123. See supra Part III.B.1.
124. Indeed, appellate courts are already beginning to focus their attention on whether improper conduct occurred such that application of the Monday rule is warranted. See State v. Pierce, No.
39348-4-II, 2011 WL 5357095, at *15–16 (Wash. Ct. App. Nov. 8, 2011) (finding reference to “nosnitch” rule in relation to gang activity did not constitute an appeal to racial stereotypes); State v.
Fuller, No. 67435-8-1, 2011 WL 4489006, at *2 (Wash. Ct. App. Sept. 26, 2011) (finding alleged
prosecutorial misconduct did not inject racial bias into the trial proceedings).
125. Task Force Report, supra note 1, at 671.
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bias in Washington remains uncertain and the best approach to combat
its presence has sparked widespread debate, what is certain is that the
solution must be one that is fair and maintains the respect of those who
put their trust in the system.

